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a diScuSSion papeR baSed on The bRiTiSh accounTing aSSociaTion Financial accounTing and RepoRTing 
Special inTeReST gRoup (FaRSig) colloquiuM, 9 JanuaRy 2009 
The Future of Financial Reporting 2009:  
A Time of Global Financial Crisis
ABouT ACCA
ACCA (the Association of Chartered Certified 
Accountants) is the global body for professional 
accountants. We aim to offer business-relevant, 
first-choice qualifications to people of application, 
ability and ambition around the world who seek a 
rewarding career in accountancy, finance and 
management. 
We support our 131,500 members and 362,000 
students throughout their careers, providing 
services through a network of 80 offices and 
centres. Our global infrastructure means that 
exams and support are delivered – and reputation 
and influence developed – at a local level, directly 
benefiting stakeholders wherever they are based, 
or plan to move to, in pursuit of new career 
opportunities. Our focus is on professional values, 
ethics, and governance, and we deliver value-
added services through our global accountancy 
partnerships, working closely with multinational 
and small entities to promote global standards 
and support. 
We use our expertise and experience to work with 
governments, donor agencies and professional 
bodies to develop the global accountancy 
profession and to advance the public interest. 
Our reputation is grounded in over 100 years of 
providing world-class accounting and finance 
qualifications. We champion opportunity, diversity 
and integrity, and our long traditions are 
complemented by modern thinking, backed by a 
diverse, global membership. By promoting our 
global standards, and supporting our members 
wherever they work, we aim to meet the current 
and future needs of international business.
© The association of chartered certified accountants,  
december 2009
The paper is available in pdF from the acca 
website at: www.accaglobal.com/general/
activities/library/financial_reporting/other
The Financial Accounting and Reporting Special Interest 
Group (FARSIG) is a group set up under the aegis of the 
British Accounting Association (BAA). The main purpose of 
the FARSIG is to further the objectives of the British 
Accounting Association and for that purpose to
encourage research and scholarship in financial •	
accounting and reporting 
establish a network of researchers and teachers in •	
financial accounting and reporting
enhance the teaching of financial accounting and •	
reporting
provide support for PhD students in financial •	
accounting and reporting
develop close links with the accounting profession in •	
order to inform policy
publish a newsletter and organise targeted workshops•	
develop and maintain relationships with the British •	
Accounting Association and the professional 
accountancy institutes, and 
provide a forum for the exchange of ideas among •	
accounting academics.
The symposium, which is one of an annual series, provides 
a forum for academic, practitioner and policy-orientated 
debate. Such forums are useful for expressing and 
developing rounded opinion on the current meta-issues 
facing financial reporting. They are also useful in that they 
serve to illustrate the policy relevance and impact of 
current academic thinking and outputs in accordance with 
The Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC)/ 
Advanced Institute of Managament (AIM) calls for relevant 
and rigorous research through a combination of 
practitioner and academic perspectives. 
We would like to express our thanks to the five main 
contributors, both for their presentations at the symposium 
and for their subsequent time and comments during the 
development of this discussion paper. We have tried 
faithfully to capture the flavour of the original presentations. 
Nonetheless, although we ran our commentary of the 
presentations past the original authors, any errors or 
omissions remain our own. We would also thank ACCA for 
hosting the symposium and for its support in the 
publication of the discussion paper. Finally, for any readers 
who wish to learn more about FARSIG or to become a 
FARSIG member, please contact either of the authors. 
Mike Jones (michaeljohn.jones@bristol.ac.uk) is chairman 
and Richard Slack (richard.slack@northumbria.ac.uk), 
secretary to the FARSIG Committee. 
The Future of Financial Reporting 2009: 
A Time of Global Financial Crisis
Michael John Jones  
Professor of Financial Reporting 
University of Bristol 
Richard Slack
Professor of Accounting
Newcastle Business School
Northumbria University
2I am very pleased to provide a few introductory words to this report on the FARSIG symposium held in January 2009. 
The theme of the future of financial reporting at a time of global crisis was very topical. The papers and discussion, well 
captured in this summary, set out the main thoughts at that point, both on the role of accounting in the crisis and the 
impact of the crisis on accounting. The factors which provoked a crisis on that scale and the issues that needed to be 
thought about were then becoming clear and agreed upon, but the longer-term changes and preventative measures were 
only just starting to be mapped out. 
It is very helpful to bring together accounting academics and those in the profession with more practical perspectives to 
consider these sorts of issues and the FARSIG colloquiums have been a great example of this. ACCA was therefore very 
happy to sponsor FARSIG and to host this event. We hope to continue our support in coming years.
Richard Martin 
Head of Financial Reporting, ACCA
Foreword
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Financial reporting itself is at an interesting juncture. The 
global financial crisis has meant a re-questioning of basic 
issues within accounting such as measurement principles, 
financial regulation, the conceptual framework and the 
future landscape of global accounting standards. The 
2009 FARSIG symposium was held at ACCA, London, on 9 
January 2009 and focused on the impact of the current 
global financial crisis on the future of financial reporting. 
The symposium was thus timely to capture the current 
financial situation and its significance to accounting. The 
symposium enabled five key presentations to be delivered 
followed by discussion. These five papers were:
Ian Mackintosh, ASB – 1. The Future of Financial Reporting 
in a time of Global Uncertainty.
Peter Holgate, PricewaterhouseCoopers – 2. Organisational 
Politics: the IASB, the FASB, the EU et al.
Ken Peasnell, Lancaster University – 3. Asset 
Securitization, Fair Values and the Credit Crunch.
Alan Teixeira, IASB – 4. The International Spread of 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS): 
Challenges and Opportunities.
Paul Moxey, ACCA – 5. Corporate Governance and the 
Credit Crunch. 
The five papers and subsequent discussion expressed a 
range of views on the current financial crisis and 
accounting and reporting from accounting practitioners, 
standard setters and academics. 
BACkGRound To The symposium
The symposium was held at a particularly interesting time 
both economically and politically. The world has been 
buffeted by a credit crunch and this has affected all 
aspects of economic and political life, including 
accounting. The world’s economic crisis had begun in the 
US, partly as the result of an over-heated housing market 
coupled with excessive risk taking, credit availability and 
lending practices within the banking sector and a surge in 
the trading of credit risk derivatives. The collapse of the US 
mortgage market, among other things, acted as a catalyst 
that ultimately led to an international banking crisis. 
However, the global financial crisis, like other financial 
crises that have preceded it (most notably the South East 
Asian crisis in 1997 and the Russian crisis in1998) is the 
culmination of a number of interrelated factors. The 
combination of these factors lead to events which could 
not have been predicted. They led, seemingly inexorably, to 
collapses in the world banking system, economic turmoil 
and then global recession. 
From early 2000, US interest rates fell steadily, from over 
6% to 1% by 2004, which stimulated growth in home 
ownership in the US mortgage market backed by 
corresponding increases in the value of real estate. Those 
involved in the housing market (banks, home buyers and 
indeed governments) all seemed to believe and act as if 
the cheap lending was effectively risk free, as any default 
would be more than covered by the security held on the 
underlying asset (real estate). This thinking led to an 
environment of high-risk lending and the growth of the US 
sub-prime mortgage market. In addition, to reduce 
individual bank credit risk exposure, there was a 
corresponding increase in the development of and trading 
in credit derivative products, most notably collateralised 
debt obligations (CDOs). This further increased the 
interdependence within the banking sector and bank 
exposure to the credit, and original mortgage, market. For 
instance, in 2006 Northern Rock moved into sub-prime 
lending through a deal with Lehman Brothers, who in turn 
underwrote the risk. 
By 2005–2006 US interest rates had steadily increased to 
over 5%, owing to concerns about economic over-heating 
and the need to dampen down inflationary pressures. This 
general pattern of interest rate movement and real estate 
growth was mirrored in the UK where interest rates fell to 
3.5% by 2004 before rising to near 5% by 2006. In the US, 
in particular, owing to the increased financing cost of debt, 
debt default rates rose and real estate values started to fall 
as the market reacted to forced housing sales and the 
realisation that the housing market itself had over-heated 
and that real estate was fundamentally over-valued. The 
banking sector was now exposed to credit default, no 
longer backed by an underlying asset value of equal or 
greater value than the loan. Banks themselves had 
obtained the initial finance for lending, and on-going 
refinancing, through revolving credit facilities from the 
wholesale money markets. As lending became exposed, 
owing to credit defaults and falling real estate prices, so 
liquidity in the money markets also began to tighten and 
refinancing became more difficult and more expensive to 
obtain. By 2007, the difficulties faced by banks – heightened 
by their exposure to the US sub-prime market, and also by 
their exposure and reliance on the wholesale money 
markets – began to become apparent. Just prior to the 
Symposium there were a number of high-profile banking 
and real estate credit collapses, the most important of 
which are summarised chronologically in the box.
1. introduction
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CRisis
August 2007: 
Liquidity in credit markets tightened. PNB Paribas 
announced that three of its hedge funds were frozen owing 
to the complete lack of liquidity in the asset-backed 
security market, the result of US sub-prime exposure.
The European Central Bank injected 170 million euros into 
the banking market to provide short-term liquidity.
september 2007: 
Collapse of Northern Rock owing to lack of liquidity and 
availability of finance in the wholesale money markets. 
Bank of England bail-out assistance as lender of last 
resort. Northern Rock was subsequently nationalised in 
2008.
march 2008: 
Rescue of Bear Stearns by JP Morgan Chase and US 
government guarantee of $30 billion against Bear Stearns 
losses.
september 2008: 
Lloyds TSB takeover of Halifax Bank of Scotland.
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac rescue by US government.
Bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, citing bank debt of $613 
billion after US government refused bail-out finance.
Merrill Lynch taken over by Bank of America.
AIG rescued by $85 billion loan from US Treasury.
Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley abandon their status 
as investment banks.
Collapse of mortgage provider Washington Mutual; sold to 
JP Morgan Chase.
october 2008: 
US and European government interventions.
Approval of TARP – Troubled Asset Relief Program – 
authorising the US Treasury to spend up to $700 million to 
purchase distressed assets and provide banking sector 
liquidity.
Similar interventions approved in Germany (500 million 
euros), France (350 million euros) and Spain (100 million 
euros).
Icelandic government takes control of the three largest 
Icelandic banks: Landsbanki, Glitnir and Kaupthing. 
november 2008: 
G20 summit in Washington focuses on future financial 
regulation.
IMF approves $2.1 billion loan to Iceland. 
december 2008: 
US Federal Reserve interest rate is near 0%.
The impact of the crisis initiated in the banking and real 
estate sectors falls has fed through to the real economy. 
Global stock markets and national economies have taken a 
pounding. Economic problems have been reflected in 
lower levels of corporate investment, increased 
unemployment rates and a lowering of general consumer 
confidence. These factors, (alongside credit availability) 
have contributed to the collapse of a number of non-
banking companies in the UK, for instance, Woolworths. 
The financial crisis and turmoil has wider implications for 
all businesses (and for auditors in expressing an opinion 
on their financial statements) with respect to the going 
concern assumption. Owing to the general tightening of 
credit, businesses are now faced with far greater debt 
exposure, which undermines the going concern basis on 
which their financial statements have traditionally been 
prepared and audited. 
The immediate consequences of the banking crisis led to a 
focus by government and other regulatory bodies on, inter 
alia, the underlying regulatory, accounting and corporate 
governance aspects of the credit crunch. The risk and 
reward structures within the major banks were examined, 
with questions being asked about levels of risk taken and 
the remuneration structures of top executives and market 
traders – particularly where incentive bonus schemes were 
based on lending levels. Turning more specifically to 
accounting, questions were asked about the 
appropriateness of the current regulatory regimes. In 
particular, did existing accounting standards actually 
exacerbate the situation through the accounting 
recognition and measurement of derivatives and financial 
instruments traded by banks prior to and during the credit 
crisis? The role and influence of the international 
accounting standard board was questioned worldwide, and 
there was close scrutiny of recent pronouncements on 
recognition and measurement issues, in particular those 
on financial instruments. These issues are briefly covered 
below, but were covered in more depth by the speakers.
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issues RAised By The symposium
The role of accounting in the financial crisis was much 
discussed during the symposium. One issue was the role 
of fair value. In essence, fair value is a relatively new 
measurement system that is, in the current thinking of the 
standard setters, more relevant for decision making than is 
historic cost.1 Those who support the use of fair value 
during the credit crunch state that it merely records the 
present value of assets in line with their market value and 
thus serves to reflect current market conditions, so that 
assets are not held at over-valued or under-valued prices 
as shown on the balance sheet. However, its detractors are 
concerned that assets may be recorded at fire-sale prices 
that do not reflect the assets’ true value, but rather reflect 
short-term volatility. An additional concern about fair value 
is that pro-cyclicality (self-reinforcing trends) may occur, 
resulting in a downward spiral of asset values. This could 
exacerbate the financial crisis owing to asset write-downs, 
and the downgrading of credit ratings based on asset 
values as shown on the balance sheet. Fair value has also 
led to enhanced concerns with going concern, because of 
the potential for such write-downs, with potential breaches 
of debt or loan covenants, and because of its possible 
effect on the ability of a business to safeguard, or provide 
assurances about, its future financing requirements.
Another issue was the role of financial instruments in the 
crisis, and their accounting recognition and measurement, 
captured in the discussion and controversy surrounding 
IAS 39 Financial Instruments Amendments in October 
2008. Mortgages that had been advanced by financial 
institutions were wrapped up into complex packages, such 
as CDOs, and sold from one institution to another, resulting 
in a complex derivative market for mortgage-based, 
asset-backed products. The final owners of these 
securitised assets often had little idea of the true nature 
and value of their assets, or of the actual or potential levels 
of risk contained within the financial instrument held. This 
became apparent with the collapse of Lehman Brothers 
when the financial exposure of other financial institutions 
to Lehman’s was not immediately known until derivative 
products were unravelled. Also, too many of these assets 
were held off-balance sheet which added to the 
uncertainty of financial exposure and levels of risk. Other 
financial instruments, such as Credit Default Swaps (CDS), 
have also been subject to public scrutiny for their role in 
the crisis. 
1.  For a detailed review of fair value and its application to accounting 
measurement interested readers should see the FARSIG symposium 2008 
discussion paper, The Future of Financial Reporting 2008: Measurement and 
Stakeholders, and in particular the symposium papers presented by 
Geoffrey Whittington and Richard Martin.
Perhaps inevitably, the standard setting bodies have also 
come under close public scrutiny. The IASB in particular 
has been a recent advocate of fair value accounting. The 
political nature of this body is illustrated neatly by the 
controversy over IAS 39, which the speakers at the 
symposium discussed at length. Stakeholders in the 
European Union felt that this standard on financial 
instruments had been an exacerbating factor in the credit 
crunch. Therefore, considerable pressure was applied to 
the IASB, by EU leaders and finance ministers through the 
ECOFIN Council, to change this standard and, indeed, 
changes were made at very short notice. The key changes 
were connected with the reclassification of financial 
instruments. In its press release2 the IASB commented 
that ‘these amendments are the latest in a series of steps 
that the IASB has undertaken to respond to the credit 
crisis and [to ensure] that European financial institutions 
are not disadvantaged vis à vis their international 
competitors in terms of accounting rules and their 
interpretation.’ The amendments to IAS 39 introduced the 
possibility for companies reporting under IFRSs to use 
reclassification amendments from 1 July 2008.
However, these changes were not without a political cost, 
particularly in respect of international standards 
convergence with the US. There was perceived to be a lack 
of due process in the IASB decision. This was particularly 
important as the FASB is working closely with the US to 
converge their standards in the so-called road map. This 
stems from the IASB/FASB Memorandum of 
Understanding after their joint meeting in 2002 and the 
Norwalk Agreement, which established the commitment 
towards compatible accounting standards. Each party 
acknowledged their commitment to the development of 
compatible accounting standards that could be used for 
cross-border financial reporting. This commitment to 
convergence was reaffirmed at the joint meetings in April 
and October 2005, aimed at producing a common set of 
high-quality global standards. In September 2008, the 
IASB and FASB issued a progress report and timetable for 
completion. Within a month the IAS 39 amendment had 
been approved, which re-emphasised the tension and the 
difficulties involved in achieving a single set of global 
accounting standards. It is also unclear what the attitude 
of other major global players, such as China, will be to the 
IASB’s move.
Overall, therefore, the symposium came at a time of great 
political and economic upheaval. It was thus particularly 
interesting to have the views of five informed observers.
2.  ‘IASB amendments permit reclassification of financial instruments’, 
13 October 2008.
6Ian outlined the present situation with a review of recent 
key events from August 2008 to date (January 2009). 
August 2008  
US announcement of SEC road map, being the first step 
towards the US adopting IFRS and the route to increasingly 
global accounting standards.
september 2008 
Continuing credit crisis and falling equity markets put 
more pressure on financial reporting standards, with 
issues around financial instruments, capitalisation and the 
rise in political significance of accounting issues (such as 
fair value)..
october 2008 
‘Black Monday’, IASB adoption of amendments to IAS 39 
(and also IFRS 7) allowing some reclassifications in value 
relating to non-derivative financial assets, loans and 
receivables. The amendments were issued without the 
normal exposure draft process owing to the urgency 
stemming from market conditions and European 
Commission pressure.
october 2008 
Further pressure on the IASB from the European 
Commission for further changes to IAS 39: fair value 
options (FVO), embedded derivatives and impairment. 
European pressure for faster change contrasted with the 
opposition already expressed elsewhere, such as by the 
US, to the lack of due process on IAS 39. This raised 
increasing objections from other constituents over the 
speed of change and the consultation process.
november 2008 
SEC road map published, and a commitment made to 
make a decision by 2011 over whether to or not to adopt 
IFRS, but with no promises one way or the other. G20 
pressure on IASB over global standards, valuation 
guidance and off-balance sheet issues.
Thus the backdrop to the current situation is one of 
reaction to events that are supported by some parties but 
resisted by others, either in terms of the proposed changes 
or whether due process was (or was not) followed. The 
European Commission demands more urgency with its 
continuing pressure for change, whereas the US and rest 
of the world is concerned about due process. In addition, 
the US is concerned with the longer-term issue of its 
position on adopting IFRS. The IASB has provided a range 
of responses to the present situation in response to 
requests from the European Commission and G20. This 
has included the IAS 39 amendments referred to above, 
valuation guidance, exposure drafts on consolidations, 
impairment disclosures, embedded derivatives, a proposed 
exposure draft on derecognition, and a fast-track project 
on fair value options. At the same, time there is also a 
concern for longer-term thinking on governance.
The Future of Financial 
Reporting in a time of 
Global uncertainty
ian mackintosh, AsB
informed by his role as chairman of the uK accounting 
Standards board, ian’s presentation was based on his 
insights about the present situation facing the accounting 
world, some possible responses to this, the potential 
scenarios that could unfold and their implications, and a 
review of uK gaap in the future.
2. symposium papers
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The result of this is a potential ‘death-or-glory’ scenario, 
summarised by Ian, as follows: ‘I believe we are in a 
situation where the financial crisis the world is facing, and 
the pressures the IASB are having to deal with could 
ultimately lead to either the IASB securing its position as a 
long-term viable global standard setter [glory], or, 
alternatively, the demise of the present IASB as constituted 
[death]’. Four possible scenarios and outcomes were then 
presented. 
scenario 1: 
Europe believes that the IASB has not responded 
appropriately and/or quickly enough, and seeks its own 
framework (a carve-out). Europe would no longer comply 
with IFRS and as a consequence the US would lose interest 
in adopting it, resulting in the demise of the vision of a 
global accounting standard. Alternatively, a better result 
for IASB would be that the US might persevere with its 
interest in adopting IFRS but, owing to its stance, Europe 
would become isolated over global accounting standard 
goals. 
scenario 2: 
This is a more conspiracy theory formulated scenario. The 
G20 does not believe the IASB has responded 
appropriately to financial reporting issues. The outcome of 
which is that the G20 makes moves to take over, 
reconstitute or replace IASB.
scenario 3: 
The US decides not to adopt IFRS, at least not for the 
foreseeable future, and to stay with US GAAP. As a result, 
US and international GAAP remain – with the IASB battling 
on, working hard with other countries over IFRS adoption – 
with the possible isolation of US from global accounting 
goals.
scenario 4: 
The ‘glory’ scenario, where the IASB and FASB proposals 
on the credit crunch and the current financial crisis are 
accepted by the G20 and the European Commission and 
the US moves to adopt IFRS. This is the best result, and 
provides the long-term stability for global accounting 
standards after the credit crunch passes. This would 
represent an outstanding achievement for the present 
IASB and provide it with a more appropriate forum for 
political input to accounting issues. The IASB would then 
have the credibility and unity to examine how its future 
political influence could best be both ensured and used 
through due process and potential constitutional review. 
The position of UK GAAP in the future was reviewed, based 
on the alternatives of death (scenarios 1 or 2) or glory 
(scenario 4). Assuming glory, following a six-month 
consultation period, IFRS would be extended to all publicly 
accountable entities. Based on what happens at a national 
level, micro entities may not need to report under IFRS at 
all, and small entities may retain the Financial Reporting 
Standard for Smaller Entities (FRSSE) which would be 
reviewed in due course. Those that are not micro, small or 
publicly accountable would report under IFRS for SMEs. At 
present, there is too much irrelevant disclosure currently 
required for subsidiaries under IFRS and this would need 
to be rationalised. The future for UK GAAP in the ‘death’ 
scenarios is clearly bleak, and bad news for the City of 
London as a global financial centre. The UK, possibly along 
with Europe, would be isolated from the rest of the world 
with the potential of the return of national standards in UK 
and European countries. Any idea of global accounting 
standards would clearly be ended.
QuesTions And disCussion
A range of issues was raised following the presentation. 
These have been summarised as follows.
The reaction of China, India and Japan to current events: •	
all of whom were concerned over lack of due process re 
the IAS 39 amendments. For Japan, there is a 
Memorandum of Understanding, and the IASB is moving 
ahead with this in line with a continued move towards IFRS 
global adoption if scenario 4 is the outcome.
Whether it matters if there are differences in global •	
standards, and the idea that competition between global 
accounting bodies is a good thing rather than not. The 
problem with this view is the current global disparities 
between	the	financial	positions	of	companies	across	
countries, and the consequent investment decision 
problems. While national standards bodies are important, 
they would still need to input into global standards.
Increasing demands from Europe for changes in •	
accounting standards, and the need to manage political 
pressure. Again under scenario 4, post-crisis the IASB 
would emerge as a strong body and a forum for due 
political input and management. If Europe were to be 
isolated, then the US may take the lead on international 
standards with the UK following. 
The role of the European Financial Reporting Advisory •	
Group (EFRAG) advice on current and future technical 
issues, given the urgent adoption of the IAS 39 
amendments without due process and consultation.
The issue of reactive or proactive accounting changes and •	
standards	in	the	current	global	financial	crisis	and	
uncertainty. The problem with such crises is their 
unpredictability, and as a result changes tend to be 
reactive rather than proactive in nature. The dangers are 
those of over-reaction and the potential for political 
interference in such accounting changes.
8organisational politics: 
the iAsB, the FAsB, the 
eu et al.
peter holgate, pricewaterhouseCoopers
peter holgate provided a practitioner and accounting 
professional insight into the current crisis, its 
implications for valuation, current reporting and going 
concern issues and his reflections on ian Mackintosh’s 
earlier presentation. he began his presentation by 
referring to the problems arising from the huge losses on 
financial assets with the associated problem of ‘thin 
markets’ lacking liquidity for normal trading of (financial) 
assets. 
The consequent valuation and measurement problems 
arising from the ‘thinness’ of markets has added another, 
specifically accounting, dimension to the current 
problems. owing to the market conditions, such 
transactions that have occurred have been at low prices, 
but these prices have been regarded as the best indicator 
of fair value. applying these low benchmark prices has 
resulted in fair value losses elsewhere. This has led to 
criticisms of fair value. Some critics have argued for a 
retreat to historical cost. however, peter argued that in 
the context of the current crisis we need even more (not 
less) fair value information on assets and liabilities. 
There has not been a wholesale rush to abandon fair value, 
but a partial one; for instance, through the IASB’s IAS 39 
reclassification amendment. Deutsche Bank recently 
reported under this amendment. By using this 
reclassification, Deutsche Bank reported a profit, whereas 
without the reclassification a loss would have arisen. 
However, this is really a presentational change, as all the 
detail is still presented in the notes to the accounts. 
However, despite the adverse market conditions and 
limited application of the reclassification amendment, fair 
value continues in 99% of cases. In practice, the calls for 
the abandonment of fair value have translated into more 
disclosure, especially of impairment values. 
The need for more disclosure and the impact of the crisis 
on the valuation and measurement of financial assets was 
highlighted by the IASB’s new Exposure Draft, Investments 
in Debt Instruments. This would use twofold disclosure of 
losses on debt instruments – against amortised cost and 
against fair value. However, despite advocating more 
disclosure, the Exposure Draft was not supported for a 
number of reasons. First, the time for consideration and 
comment was limited to only a three-week exposure time, 
from 23 December 2008 to 15 January 2009. As well as 
worries over the abbreviated exposure draft time, there 
were concerns over the extended scope of the Exposure 
Draft, which had been widened to other debt securities 
(‘scope creep’), and the practical difficulties of application. 
These difficulties would be even more pronounced if any 
revised standard were to be applicable immediately, that 
is, to 2008 year ends – indeed, such implementation 
would be almost impossible to achieve, as to collect the 
data in such a short time-frame appears infeasible.3
Peter then discussed what is currently happening in year 
end reporting and the issue of the going concern basis of 
preparation and its implications for the audit opinions. 
From a practice perspective, there is now a lot more 
scrutiny and detailed disclosures of the impairment of 
financial assets, property, plant and equipment and stock. 
The calculations and disclosures are not new but are 
particularly important in sectors such as construction 
where, if value in use (present value of cash flows) is being 
used, it becomes a very difficult exercise to estimate future 
cash flows and hence asset valuation.
With regard to the going concern basis for the preparation 
of accounts, if there are significant doubts then there is a 
need not only for detailed disclosure of these doubts by 
the directors, for instance, on refinancing assumptions, but 
also for directors and auditors to re-evaluate normal 
assumptions of going concern where appropriate. Going 
concern questions are occupying firms and the profession 
in general. One major issue with any question of going 
concern in the audit opinion is the impact on future 
financing for the business. This is thus a very sensitive 
issue given that it could affect the firm’s ability to raise 
future finances in an already difficult market. In the 
financial sector and elsewhere auditors are drawing 
3.  Post-event note: in recognition of these difficulties, the IASB withdrew 
these proposals later in February 2009.
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attention to the directors’ disclosure on the availability of 
financing and of the company’s ability to meet any 
financing needs for the foreseeable future (12 months). 
Finally, Peter made a few remarks on Ian Mackintosh’s 
commentary. Ultimately it is difficult to predict which of 
the four scenarios will be realised. Looking at the 2011/12 
world map of countries that would potentially adopt IFRS 
– the EU, Central and Eastern Europe, China, Japan, South 
Korea, India, Canada, the Middle East and much of South 
America – it is possible that the current dominance and 
power of the IASB board of the US and EU would be 
watered down. It is possible that we could see the US 
retreat into isolation. If we look back a few years, Europe 
was the main power bloc using IAS. If we look forwards, 
however, we can envisage IFRS being used in most of the 
world. The more countries sign up to IFRS, the more the 
influence of the EU and the US declines. Over the last 
couple of years fewer companies have been seeking to list 
on the US market as foreign private issuers. This has 
demonstrated the relative unattractiveness of the US 
market and its potential decline in power against other 
global markets.
Looking back on our current times, it may be that we will 
conclude that we were naive in saying that a private body, 
the IASB, could set itself up as a world body and operate 
without political interference. It is hard to find other 
examples of successful private sector, non-governmental 
international bodies. The IASB has now become more 
engaged politically, and it will need to manage this process 
of engagement to ensure that it remains connected to the 
political process but still is independent and respected for 
that.
QuesTions And disCussion
Issues were raised around going concern, accounting 
principles, and theory and practice, as well as further 
reflections on Ian Mackintosh’s earlier presentation.
There was concern that deciding on the •	
appropriateness of going concern was now placing a 
ridiculous burden on auditors. Thus, in the current 
financial situation, what would be wrong with including 
a going concern modification in the audit opinions of all 
companies?  
 
This suggestion was viewed as unrealistic. For a 
number of companies, the directors are (too) optimistic. 
They think they have a mixture of new financing and 
asset sales in place. They think they will be all right for 
the foreseeable future, and thus the going concern 
basis of preparation is appropriate. However, banks 
may not be as willing to provide financing as the 
directors had hoped; also it may be harder than 
expected to sell the assets in question. Is the board 
properly disclosing to shareholders the issues and 
assumptions regarding future financing? Thus it is 
important that auditors are not only content with the 
assumptions used by the board in preparing accounts 
on a going concern basis, but also recognise the need 
to evaluate the assumptions given the current financial 
situation. It is not easy, but professional judgement 
must be exercised and, if necessary, going concern 
issues will have to be referred to in the auditor’s 
opinion if there are material uncertainties or 
disagreement about the basis on which the accounts 
have been prepared.
A question was raised concerning practice as against •	
principles. In the term ‘GAAP’, the ‘P’ means ‘Practice’ 
in the US, but in the UK it means ‘Principles’.  
 
Peter expressed his personal view that he favoured 
principles applied with judgement. The role of a 
profession is to exercise judgement. The US profession 
has problems because it has been brought up using 
rules; but standards should be based on principles, not 
on rules, and the use of professional judgement in their 
application.
Is the gap between theory and practice getting bigger, •	
especially because of impairment?  
 
Practically speaking, impairment calculations are very 
tricky, but the underlying principles are sound. Peter’s 
auditing colleagues think the standards are too 
theoretical and they criticise fair value in some 
circumstances. While fair value disclosure is sensible, 
often the presentation is very difficult, too volatile, not 
realistic, with data not easy to assimilate; for instance, 
the Exposure Draft on Debt Instruments referred to 
earlier. Is the current financial reporting system really 
broken? The amount of potential future disclosure may 
also be in danger of getting out of hand, leading to a 
revamping of financial statements and questions over 
their usefulness.
Finally, reflecting on Ian Mackintosh’s presentation (will •	
glory prevail? – scenario 4).  
 
It is quite easy to see that the IASB is caught between a 
rock and three or four hard places. If we look forward a 
few years, we can easily imagine the US and Europe, 
China and others all lobbying the IASB, seeking to 
retain their own positions of influence. In the period 
1970–1990, the standards issued by the UK Accounting 
Standards Committee had to be approved by all six of 
its sponsoring professional bodies, and any of them 
could reject its standards. This could happen on the 
international stage, and the result may be potential 
fragmentation of international standards on national 
lines.
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Asset securitization, Fair 
values and the Credit 
Crunch 
ken peasnell, lancaster university
Ken’s presentation focused on the current credit crunch, 
the issues around asset securitisation and whether 
accounting and financial reporting were in any way to 
blame for the current situation. This discussion may also 
serve to achieve a sense of proportion about the issues 
underpinning the crisis. Ken commenced the 
presentation with an appropriate quotation: ‘when you 
see a depressed and lonely old man staggering away 
from his local turf accountant, re-lighting half a rolled up 
cigarette…you can comfort yourself with the knowledge 
that (a) at least it was his own money that he wasted, and 
(b) at least the horse he blew it on actually existed. 
neither of these consolations applies to failed banks’. 
(Zaltman 2008) The lessons learnt from this quotation 
relate to the creation of derivative products, increased 
levels of risk, and undue confidence in past market 
conditions and returns.
The crisis itself is a macroeconomic phenomenon caused 
by a long economic boom, surging house prices and low 
central bank interest rates, all of which encouraged 
increasing levels of lending and resultant corporate and 
private household debt. As lending rose, banks 
increasingly financed this using the wholesale money 
markets backed by asset securitisation (such as on 
property), on the assumption that the growth in the value 
of the underlying assets would continue. These boom 
conditions resulted in a situation of over-confidence, 
increasing levels of risk and the growth of more dubious 
business dealings. However, proportionally, the American 
sub-prime mortgage market represented only a small 
percentage of total global debt, which made the crisis that 
did arise all the more unpredictable. Indeed, it represented 
the confluence and summation of a number of factors, 
including those mentioned above, and was not the result of 
sub-prime lending alone. When this is understood then the 
challenges facing the IASB in supporting the role of 
financial reporting in re-creating trust in the banking 
system are evident.
The key points about asset securitisation and its growth 
were then set out. First, what led to the development of 
asset securitisation? Factors included: banks seeking 
additional finance vehicles to back lending; investors’ 
appetite for derivative products; regulators seeing this as a 
way of spreading risk; and governments as a way of 
financing increased levels of home ownership.. However, 
the risk behind asset securitisations took on unexpected 
forms. Good lending practices and financial prudence were 
driven out by more risky lending on the assumption of 
rising asset prices used to back loans. Risk was viewed as 
being spread by primary and secondary investment in 
securitisations; but this is not the same as risk being 
managed, so a growing false comfort resulted, with 
investors more and more unable to ascertain the real 
quality of the underlying assets and the actual credit rating 
of secondary securitisation products. 
Along with unreliable credit ratings, there were other 
factors that also contributed to problems in asset 
securitisation: bank bonus schemes that encouraged 
excessive risk taking; lack of prudential board governance 
and management; as well as the huge growth of credit 
default swaps (c. $60 trillion). Hedge funds had invested in 
the riskiest tranches of securitisations, typically hedged by 
short positions in the ABX index. As the sub-prime 
problem became evident so the market feared the 
continued ability of securitisations to meet returns. This 
resulted in a collapse of the securitisation market, and the 
consequent funding crisis for banks that were dependent 
on that market for their own financial position.
So amid this market turmoil what, if any, was the role of 
accounting in the crisis? First, in the US, did the off-
balance sheet treatment of securitisations mean that 
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transparency was impaired? (It should be noted that in the 
UK, for instance, Northern Rock’s securitisations were on 
balance sheet.) However, did the fact that US 
securitisations were generally off the balance sheet delude 
investors? Research by Landsman et al. (2008) suggests it 
did not. Ken outlined that the research which consolidated 
SPEs [Special Purpose Entities] for 112 US firms, found 
that the weights attached in a residual income pricing 
model to the securitized assets and liabilities were no 
different to those for assets and liabilities already on-
balance sheet. Other evidence also supports the view that 
the securities markets are mature and sophisticated 
enough correctly to value businesses, including any 
securitisations (see, for instance, Nui and Richardson 
2006; Chen et al. 2008). 
Second, and a key problem highlighted by the crisis, under 
regulatory rules such as Basel I and II, capital definitions 
start with accounting numbers. Thus, there appears to be 
a greater need to change the regulations rather than to 
blame the accounting that results from the implementation 
of such regulations. Look at the causes of the issue rather 
than the symptoms. 
Qualifying Special Purpose Entities (QSPEs) were then 
outlined, noting the way in which they had been used, and 
consequent valuation issues within the crisis. QSPEs were 
meant to be purely passive pass-through vehicles for SPE 
security holders. However, QSPEs were increasingly used 
to handle complex bundles of securities (including 
derivatives) that required active management and financial 
support. Indeed, many SPEs had to be rescued by their 
originators, with SPE assets and liabilities ending up back 
on the balance sheet as a result, raising the question of 
whether they had actually been sold or loaned in the first 
place. Given their on balance sheet treatment, how were 
such SPEs to be valued? It is clear that property-backed 
financial assets lost value as the property and 
securitisation markets fell. However, fair value estimation 
becomes very imprecise in a now illiquid market suffering 
from the credit crunch, ‘a fair value level 3 world’ (no 
observable market data). In such an illiquid market even 
with observable data (levels 1 and 2), critics of fair value 
argue that true value is then understated and losses 
overstated because fire sales act as a market benchmark 
price on which other similar asset values are based. 
The IASB response to this was encapsulated by its actions 
in October and December 2008. On 13 October 2008, 
amendments to IAS 39 and IFRS 7 permitted 
reclassification of certain non-derivative financial assets 
out of the profit or loss category, to be accounted for at 
cost (and thus left on the balance sheet), and the transfer 
of certain available-for-sale financial assets to loans and 
receivables. Readers should also refer to the previous 
commentary on Ian Mackintosh’s presentation. On 22–23 
December 2008, additional amendments to IAS 39 and 
IFRIC 9 were as follows:
To require an embedded derivative to be separated out •	
from a host contract when a hybrid financial asset is 
reclassified out of fair value through profit or loss.
If the fair value of the embedded derivative cannot be •	
reliably measured, then the entire instrument cannot be 
transferred
Additional disclosures about the effects on profit or loss •	
of using fair value and amortised cost for debt 
instruments, other than those included in fair value 
through the profit or loss category.
The issues challenging accounting at present are concerns 
over fair value application and whether it serves in a crisis 
to understate assets and overstate losses/liabilities. 
However, the stock market does not appear to believe that 
fair value is understating asset values, as the shares of 
59% of all banks listed in the US were trading in November 
2008 at less than their book value. Clearly fair value does 
work best when securities are traded in transparent, liquid 
markets with readily known prices, but that is not the case 
at present in a climate of uncertainty and forced sales. 
Overall perhaps, this issue needs to be set against a 
background of the still-primitive development of 
conceptual models of measurement within accounting.
Finally, the presentation then considered measurement 
issues and the importance of correlations in measurement 
errors. ‘Earnings’ is the difference between two numbers 
(book value at T0 and book value at T1) over a time period, 
and so correlation matters. The variance in income is 
found by:
 var (income) = var(BV0) + var(BV1) – 2cov(BV0,BV1)
A simple worked example of uncorrelated errors and its 
impact was given, where measures are unbiased and 
independent (and so covariance is zero), but can vary by 
+/-10%, with equal probability starting at 100 at time T0.
book Value T0 book Value T1
90 108
100 120
110 132
This gives us three earning situations as follows:
earnings
Max loss = 110 at T0 to 108 atT1 = -2
Max income = 90 at T0 to 132 T1 = +42
‘True income’ = 100 at T0 to 120 T1 = +20
Thus a balance sheet error of 10% has resulted (and 
magnified) in an income error with a standard deviation of 
63%. If errors are positively correlated across time, 
however, then the income error would be reduced. The 
new disclosures will present many opportunities for this to 
be researched in greater depth! 
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In conclusion, Ken Peasnell maintained that the nature of 
the current crisis poses no new issues for financial 
reporting, and is essentially a fundamental problem of 
bank regulation, governance and management. However, 
given the challenges that face accounting, such as those 
around fair value, the IASB and FASB will need steady 
nerves as they are faced with demands for change in 
response to the crisis.
QuesTions And disCussion
The questions were mainly concerned with asset value and 
the underlying securities markets.
Are securitised losses currently over-estimated? Ken •	
stated that clearly there is an economic risk of this 
owing to the current uncertainty and the difficulties of 
establishing valuations of derivatives resulting from 
swap defaults and counter-party risk positions. 
However, even if there is short-term market error, this 
will be corrected in future, with resultant gains.
The issues of incentives around bank profit and share •	
price and taking increased levels of risk were raised. 
Ken stated that the risks had been thought to be 
appropriately managed but, owing to more complex 
counter-party risk and the falling property markets, 
both the risk and market assumptions became 
unrealistic as the crisis developed.
The failure of the securities market function to provide •	
accurate valuations for equity investors and other debt 
claims. Ken believed that while this may be a short-
term issue, the long-term position is that securities 
markets are mature and sophisticated enough to 
provide accurate values for financial products and 
furnish accurate corporate valuations. 
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The international spread 
of international Financial 
Reporting standards 
(iFRs): Challenges and 
opportunities
Alan Teixeira, iAsB
The views expressed by alan in his presentation are 
based on his own personal reflections concerning global 
accounting standards, as a member of the iaSb. The 
presentation covered three main aspects, namely: the 
benefits and challenges of global standards; the FaSb-
iaSb Memorandum of understanding (Mou); and a 
review of the credit crisis, specifically the reclassification 
process re iaS 39, and the steps that were taken in 
relation to this.
One of the main benefits of global standards is that of the 
consistency of financial reporting. Global standards are 
viewed as fundamental to achieving a high-quality global 
financial reporting system, which in turn results in 
increased transparency. This facilitates investment, and 
reduces both the cost of capital and overall reporting 
costs. The move towards creating a global platform has 
gathered momentum, with the establishment of, inter alia, 
the IASB in 2001; EU adopting IFRS in 2002; Australia, 
New Zealand, Hong Kong and South Africa committing to 
adopt IFRS in 2003; and, in 2006, a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) between the FASB and the IASB. 
By January 2009, IFRSs are used by listed entities in over 
110 jurisdictions, and by unlisted entities in over 80 
jurisdictions. More telling data about the adoption of global 
standards are provided by Fortune Global 500 reporting 
data from July 2008, and by comparing these data with 
forecast reporting to 2012, based on companies’ 
announced plans. Using this data, at present 39% of 
Fortune Global 500 companies report using IFRS or IFRS 
equivalents, and this is forecast to rise to 49% by 2012. 
Thirty-one per cent currently use US GAAP and this is 
expected to remain at this level, and a further 31% 
currently use national GAAP which is forecast to reduce to 
21%. This marks a shift away from national GAAP towards 
IFRS by 2012. As regards the US adopting IFRS, in 
November 2008 the SEC proposed its ‘road map’, with 
early adoption available to a limited group of companies 
by 2009, and with a decision in 2011 as to mandatory 
adoption of IFRS in the period 2014–16. This would be 
conditional on progress on the FASB-IASB MoU, IASB 
funding infrastructure and experience to date in the US. 
Thus adoption will be influenced by progress on current 
projects and is therefore tied up with issues arising out of 
the current credit crisis, which formed the third part of this 
presentation.
An ideal global standard would be the full adoption of IFRS 
as issued by IASB as the reporting framework, with the 
audit report confirming conformity to IFRSs without any 
localised endorsement. The overall vision is that of a single 
set of high-quality global accounting standards. This may 
be difficult to achieve, however, owing to local endorsement 
issues, local adaptations, translations and enforcement. 
Such issues may give rise to concerns as to what 
standard(s) the audit report should then refer to, and 
whether users would fully understand the nuances of full 
IFRS adoption against any localised versions and 
adaptations used in financial reporting. 
Alan then addressed the issue of adoption versus adaption 
of IFRS and the use of ‘jurisdiction equivalents’. Does 
adaptation really mean full adoption, the ideal scenario, or 
are there national variations which potentially would be a 
move away from true global standards? IFRS adaptation 
refers to cases where word-for-word adoption is not used. 
Local adaptations of IFRS are made and, consequently, the 
entities applying these are not conforming to true IFRS, 
despite their jurisdictions contending that such adapted 
standards are ‘IFRS equivalent’. This problem does not 
relate to differences in effective date or other transition 
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arrangements which may be necessary for full adoption. 
Some jurisdictions can only adopt IFRS by law, and by 
their nature laws are hard to update and time consuming 
in process. This problem may also arise even when local 
professional bodies adopt IFRS word for word. The slow 
process of adoption was highlighted by the examples of 
time lags relating to IFRSs and IASs not yet endorsed in 
the EU including, among others, IFRS 1 and IAS 27, IFRSs 
2 and 3, which were published in January 2008 and not 
yet endorsed, and IASs 1, 23, 27 and 39. Even with word-
for-word adoption there may be difficulties; for example, 
where the audit report and the basis of accounts 
preparation in the accounting policies note still refer to 
national financial reporting standards. In such a case, all 
the hard work of adopting IFRS has been carried out 
without realising the benefits, and the financial reports 
may not necessarily be recognised as IFRS-compliant in 
other jurisdictions. 
Alan then highlighted two other areas of complication: 
namely translation and enforcement issues. Translation 
issues arise from differences between the official 
translations of the IASCF and local unofficial translations, 
and the context of standards in different languages. For 
instance, in Germany the same word is used for 
amortisation and depreciation; and for Spanish-speaking 
countries, should Continental European or Latin American 
words be used? Can enforcement be rigorously and 
consistently applied across all jurisdictions? And what are 
the consequences of non-compliance and enforcement? 
Finally, Alan drew attention to the World Bank ROSC 
reports (Reports on the Observance of Standards and 
Codes (www.worldbank.org/ifa/rosc.html), the results of 
which suggest that for many countries compliance in the 
early stages of adoption is not uniform.
The second main aspect of the presentation related to the 
FASB-IASB MoU. The current crisis has forced greater 
focus on the core issues, which is to be welcomed, with the 
detail/minutiae to be dealt with later. Overall, the MoU will 
lead to an aligned conceptual framework. In the short 
term, the focus is to remove selected differences in current 
accounting standards, and in the medium term to issue 
new joint standards where significant improvement on 
current standards is required. The intention is to ensure 
that during the process of convergence standards will be 
developed in line with this longer-term goal and will not 
need to be changed twice. This could happen if short-term 
changes to standards were to be made without considering 
the overall aim of convergence. 
The MoU sets out the convergence programme between 
the IASB and the FASB. The short-term projects were to be 
completed by 2008, with convergence scheduled for 2011 
when the decision for mandatory adoption (as set out 
earlier) is to be made. Both the FASB and the IASB are 
providing ongoing guidance and time-frames for the 
completion of the MoU. A sequence of MoU milestones 
were then presented, highlighting the project area, 
progress towards milestones, the work done to date and 
the expected future work. A number of specific examples 
of these are set out below.
project Milestone Work done expect
Financial 
statement 
presentation
2011 
converged 
requirements
Preliminary 
Views Document 
(PVD) and 
Discussion Paper 
(DP) issued
Exposure 
Draft (ED) in 
2010
Fair value 
measurement 
guidance
2010 
converged 
guidance
SFAS 157 and 
DP Fair value 
Measurements 
issued
IASB ED in 
first half of 
2009
Financial 
instruments
2011 
converged 
requirements
PVD and DP on 
complexity 
issued and FASB 
ED on hedging 
issued
 
Consolidation 
and SPE
2010 
converged 
requirements
FASB EDs 
revising FIN 46R 
and FAS 140
IASB ED 
Post-
employment 
benefits
2011 
converged 
requirements
SFAS 158 and 
DP issued
IASB ED in 
second half 
of 2009
The outcome of convergence under the MoU is for 
continued cooperation, bringing a closer alignment of 
principles and development of shared standards in those 
areas needing improvement. Standards would be based on 
principles, not rules, and tied to the conceptual framework.
It was apt that the final part of the presentation examined 
the problems caused by the current financial situation in 
relation to convergence, and the tensions arising from 
conflicting interests, such as US and European 
Commission (EC) pressure. The key issue identified was 
the reclassification out of fair value, and the events of 
October 2008 and the IAS 39 amendment. Readers should 
also see the issues raised by Ian Mackintosh and Ken 
Peasnell in their presentations. 
The continued credit crisis brought increasing demands 
for reclassification from Eurogroupe (group of euro 
currency member states) and ECOFIN (the Economic and 
Financial Affairs Council) during the period 4–7 October. 
ECOFIN is a body of the Council of the European Union 
and composed of the economic and finance ministers of 
the member states, and meets on a monthly basis. On 9 
October, the IASC Foundation trustees supported the 
accelerated steps to be taken by the IASB. A seven-day ED 
was initially planned, but increasing European pressure led 
to a straight amendment in order to prevent an EC ‘carve-
out’. On 13 October, the IASB issued revisions to IAS 39 
and IFRS 7 Reclassification of Financial Assets. Owing to 
EC pressure and the urgency of the situation there was no 
time for consultation, and on 16 October the endorsed 
standard was published in the EU, following positive advice 
by the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group 
(EFRAG) and a unanimous Accounting Regulatory 
Committee (ARC) vote. The ARC is composed of 
representatives from member states and chaired by the 
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European Commission. As a result of reclassification, 
appropriate full disclosures will be necessary to fully 
inform investors. The reclassification does, however, 
address one difference between Europe and the US, but 
does not create a level playing field with US GAAP. There 
are so many other differences between IFRSs and US 
GAAP in relation to financial instruments that the longer-
term convergence goals will only be met when we have 
common standards. Although this period is clearly unusual 
and drastic measures were taken, the longer-term core 
agenda of convergence still remains and the next few years 
will be crucial in achieving progress over this.
QuesTions And disCussion
There were a number of questions raised around the 
sustainability of the convergence framework in the light of 
the current crisis.
The impact of the current crisis on short-term and •	
longer-term projects and the need for reflection and 
transparency. Two main aspects were highlighted. First, 
the need to race ahead with some short-term projects 
to restore market confidence; and second, the 
requirement to take a longer and more reflective view 
on issues such as the conceptual framework.
Concern over the achievability of the ideal standard of •	
adoption and the pragmatic need for adaption of IFRS. 
While adoption may be the ideal, how many times has 
this been fully achieved in practice? Often, adoption will 
be nearly achieved but then there may be a change of 
name, or other detail, which results in adaption. One 
solution may be to make adaption more difficult, in 
order to try and force full adoption of standards, but 
this would depend on the solidity and stability of the 
whole framework.
Another real difficulty concerns the availability of •	
reliable empirical data on which to base adoption of 
global standards. For instance, in relation to joint 
ventures, how many European joint ventures are 
currently in existence and what is their aggregate 
economic value, regardless of how that is measured? If 
there is a lack of such data it is difficult to identify the 
extent to which there are underlying differences in 
accounting – the starting point for trying to achieve a 
global change in practice.
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Corporate Governance 
and the Credit Crunch 
paul moxey, ACCA
paul Moxey, head of corporate governance and Risk 
Management at acca presented an overview of the 
credit crunch. he discussed its root causes, stating that a 
main cause is poor corporate governance. To explain this, 
he looked at ten principles of good corporate governance 
developed by acca’s corporate governance and Risk 
Management committee. 
The last few years saw an unprecedented growth in the 
size and profitability of the global banking industry. 
According to McKinsey (2008), global banking profits in 
2006 were $788 billion (over $150 billion greater than the 
next most profitable sector: oil, gas and coal). Global 
banking revenues were 6% of global GDP and its profits 
per employee were 26 times higher than the average of 
other industries. Some maintain that such profitability is 
due to regulatory anomalies (ie lack of competition, 
asymmetry of information, and externalities such as state 
support in times of trouble). The governmental rescue 
package has been put at $2 trillion. The cost to the global 
economy may be many times greater.
ACCA has met with groups of experts and identified 
several root causes of the credit crunch, including:
1. failure to manage the link between business risks and 
remuneration incentives
2. excessive risk taking and short-termism resulting from 
remuneration structures and bonuses
3. risk management departments clearly lacking influence 
and power 
4. weaknesses in reporting on risk and financial 
transactions 
5. poor oversight by senior executives, and lack of 
challenge by independent non-executive directors 
6. a general lack of accountability.
These factors, combined with imperfections in regulation 
and monetary policy, led to an excess of money supply 
and, ultimately, to the market dislocation. Further 
contributory factors were:
1.  product over-complexity and lack of managerial 
understanding of the associated risks
2. excessive leverage
3. interconnectedness of financial institutions
4. misalignment between the interests of the different 
parties involved in complex financial products 
5. complacency after a prolonged bull market
6. failure to appreciate cultural factors, such as human 
greed. 
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Previous financial episodes – such as the savings and 
loans bank crisis in the US in the late 1980s, the East 
Asian crisis in the late 1990s and the failure of Enron and 
WorldCom – taught us the importance of sound corporate 
governance and risk management. We did not learn the 
lessons in the past: we must do so now.
ACCA’s Corporate Governance and Risk Management 
Committee Agenda contains 10 principles of good 
corporate governance. The principles are set out here in 
the order given in the presentation, and are therefore not 
in numerical order (further, not all of the principles are 
detailed in this commentary). For a detailed discussion of 
all of the principles readers should refer to the ACCA 
Discussion Paper, Corporate Governance and the Credit 
Crunch (2008).
pRinCiple 1
Boards, shareholders and stakeholders should share a 
common understanding of the purpose and scope of 
corporate governance.
Good corporate governance is about boards directing and 
controlling organisations in the interests of long-term 
owners and accountability. 
pRinCiple 2
Boards should lead by example. Boards should set the 
right tone and behave accordingly, paying particular 
attention to ensuring the continuing ethical health of 
their organisations.
This embraces the impact on their employees and on the 
wider society. While bank boards owe their primary duty to 
their shareholders, they also have obligations to other 
stakeholders (eg their borrowers, employees and savers).
pRinCiple 3
Boards should set clear goals, accountabilities, 
appropriate structures and committees, delegated 
authorities and policies. They should provide sufficient 
resources to enable executive management to achieve 
the goals of the organisation through effective 
management of day-to-day operations and monitor 
management’s progress towards the achievement of 
these goals.
A fundamental role of a board is to provide direction, 
control and monitoring. The non-executive directors of 
Enron and WorldCom failed to discharge this obligation. 
Reforms, such as the US Sarbanes–Oxley Act, the EC 
Corporate Governance Action Plan, and the Higgs and 
Smith reports in the UK are intended to address this 
failure. 
pRinCiple 6
Executive remuneration promotes organisational 
performance and is transparent. Remuneration 
arrangements should be aligned with individual 
performance in such a way as to promote organisational 
performance.
Performance schemes must be based on sound principles 
and applied properly. The incentive and career structure 
packages of banks meant enormous rewards, discouraged 
prudent risk management and worked against the 
interests of other stakeholders. Risk management, 
remuneration and incentive systems must be linked. 
Transactions with high-risk profits should trigger smaller 
bonuses than similar less risky projects and profit streams. 
Risk management should be linked with remuneration 
incentives. The status of risk managers should be raised 
and they should advise the remuneration committee. 
pRinCiples 8 And 9
Boards account to shareholders and, where appropriate, 
other stakeholders for their stewardship [and] 
shareholders and other significant stakeholders hold 
boards to account.
Shareholders have limited ability to influence companies 
they own. Executive managements have therefore 
extracted increasingly larger proportions of corporate 
earnings. In addition, dispersed shareholdings create a 
fundamental governance challenge, exacerbated by the 
emergence of new strategies (eg derivatives) for 
participating in corporate profitability. The receipt by 
boards and shareholders of appropriate, clear and reliable 
information on risk and financial results will help to 
address both challenges. 
pRinCiple 4
Boards ensure their strategy actively considers both risk 
and reward over time. Consideration of risk should be a 
key part of strategy formulation. Risk management should 
be embedded within organisations so that risk is 
considered as part of decision making. Boards need to 
understand the risks faced by the organisation, satisfy 
themselves that the level of risk is acceptable and 
challenge executive management when appropriate.
Banks have highly sophisticated risk-management 
functions, yet recent events have illustrated their 
weaknesses. The Swiss bank UBS reported write-downs of 
$38 billion in 2008. Its explanation to its shareholders 
provides a clear and fascinating example of risk 
management failings such as the danger of having silos 
within organisations.
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Credit ratings also seem to be widely misunderstood.Many 
investors bought ‘AAA’-rated instruments with little or no 
further consideration of risk, thinking that such 
investments were totally ‘safe’.
A low-inflation environment stimulated a desire to look for 
new ways to generate yield (eg derivatives). Huge increases 
in computing power added to complexity by generating 
many more transactions and, thereby, apparently deep 
markets. Chief executives of banks may have had 
insufficient understanding of these new products. 
Combined with this complexity, traders were given free 
rein. The newly created yields, helped by the apparent 
safety of AAA ratings, may have mesmerised top 
management. 
Accounting for risk is a primary driver of capital value. 
Present prices, showing points rather than ranges are not 
always good indicators of future asset values. Many of the 
risk management tools, such as value at risk, assume an 
‘efficient’ market predicated on the existence of normal 
distribution, which is not always the case. 
pRinCiple 7
The organisation’s risk management and control is 
objectively challenged, independently of line 
management.
Boards and their audit committees receive a massive 
amount of information on risk, and not all of it is useful. 
The information is rather like pieces of a jigsaw puzzle. 
Unfortunately, the audit committee does not have the box 
with the picture of the puzzle on it; nor does it know how 
many pieces there are; nor whether all the pieces are from 
the same puzzle. It is also tempting for managers to make 
sure that information prepared for non-executive directors 
does not raise too many difficult questions. 
Internal auditors must be both objective and independent. 
To ensure their independence, they must not have any line 
or management responsibilities. Internal audit should 
include both risk management and the board’s oversight 
of risk. Internal auditors should report to the non-executive 
audit committee chairman rather than to an executive. 
Audit committees could find their job easier if they had 
access to a dedicated function, separate from internal and 
external audit, bringing together all the sources of 
information to create an overall assurance picture. 
At a recent debate held by ACCA, IFRSs were said to have 
added to the complexity and length of reports, but not to 
their clarity or ease of understanding. Accounts do not 
differentiate between price and value and nor provide a 
proper snapshot of either. The price of the UBS write-
downs was calculated in early 2008 as $38 billion but 
these are not actually losses. It is also unclear whether the 
accounts of the banks which recently posted large write-
downs have overstated profits in the past, or whether the 
write-downs and losses genuinely reflect a changed 
business environment.
The use of fair value can lead to some odd results. 
Concerns about a bank’s credit worthiness concerns can 
reduce the ‘fair’ value of a bank’s own debts. Strangely, a 
bank can even report a ‘profit’ on the reduction. A KPMG 
report (2008) noted that twelve European banks 
recognised such gains in 2007 (the largest such gain being 
£1.5 billion). For three banks this was more than 12% of 
pre-tax profit. 
Recent events have highlighted the fragility of financial 
institutions. Banks, by their very nature, borrow short and 
lend long. Few banks can withstand a sustained run on 
their deposits. Preparing accounts on a break-up basis, or 
with a going concern qualification, would not help and 
could itself precipitate collapse. However, the fact that 
auditors have not qualified failing banks’ financial 
statements is of concern to users, who need to know 
whether an organisation will continue as a going concern.
The credit crunch has posed other challenges for 
accountants. It may be time to take a more fundamental 
look at accounting by asking some basic questions.
1. What is the purpose of accounts? Is it to reflect an 
accurate picture of the past, inform the present, or help 
predict the future? 
2. Is a set of accounts expected to do too many things? 
What responsibility do accountants have for the use of 
accounts? 
3. What are the expectations of users? Are they realistic in 
the light of the credit crunch?
4. Should accounts pay more attention to cash?
5. If accounts are to reflect risk, should they also reflect 
the underlying probability or confidence? 
6. Which information on risks should be communicated? 
7. How can the complexity of accounts be reduced and 
their comprehensibility and value to shareholders 
enhanced? 
8. Is there an expectation gap with regard to audit 
reports? For example, do people expect an unqualified 
audit report to mean that a company will remain a 
going concern? 
The banking sector has a social function. It has a licence to 
operate from society and so is regulated. Regulation 
strongly influences bank operations, market forces and 
profitability. 
Under the Basel Accord, capital requirements change 
according to the perceived quality of an institution’s 
assets. The business cycle means that a lowering of asset 
quality tends to occur at the same time as a lowering of 
capital through losses. Banks, therefore, need more capital 
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at the very time that they have less. Assets are also 
reduced, so worsening the credit environment (ie the 
‘pro-cyclicality effect’). Basel II arguably increased pro-
cyclicality. Inconsistencies in capital regulations 
encouraged banks to use off- balance sheet vehicles to 
lower the required regulatory capital. The credit crunch 
revealed that, because of reputational risk or liquidity 
recourse agreements, these off- balance sheet vehicles 
were still organisational liabilities. We need to explore 
appropriate banking balance sheet and capital 
requirements. 
Basel II considers assets rather than liabilities and we 
probably need to consider liabilities more. Under IFRS and 
fair value accounting, price changes feed straight through 
to reported profits and capital requirements. This can 
reinforce pro-cyclicality.
We are in danger of having a system that allows profits to 
be retained in the private sector yet requires losses to be 
met by the public. This is clearly unacceptable, but finding 
a solution is challenging. ACCA does not claim to have a 
ready answer, but believes a solution will be easier to find 
if greater attention is given to the bigger picture and, in 
particular, if we ensure that organisations are properly 
governed, risks are more prudently managed, and 
accounts and related disclosures are clearer. 
More detail on the corporate governance and risk 
discussion is provided in the ACCA discussion paper 
Corporate Governance and the Credit Crunch. Other relevant 
ACCA Publications are Climbing Out of the Credit Crunch 
and Sure Enough to be Unsure? Questions for Audit 
Committees Thinking about the Credit Crisis.
QuesTions And disCussion
Various questions were raised at the end of the 
presentation and are grouped below.
What positive incentives do directors have to do a good •	
job and discharge governance in an appropriate way? 
From a shareholder perspective, a director may not be 
acting in the interests of the shareholders and fail fully 
to discharge governance requirements, but may 
nonetheless make big profits.  
 
How should people within organisations be 
remunerated? Which incentives should drive 
businesses? (For example, in the management of credit 
risk sales representatives and organisational incentives 
may not be congruent.) It is extremely difficult to be a 
representative for shareholders and other stakeholders 
at the same time. In the UK, we recognise stakeholders 
but have not gone overboard in terms of regulatory 
change. In the current situation, it is hard to find either 
board directors or experienced risk managers. The 
definition of risk appetite is very hard to define and 
manage at all levels within an organisation. 
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These five papers were presented in January 2009, against 
the backdrop of the credit crunch and of continuing and 
persistent criticism of accounting measurement policies, in 
particular the role of fair value. Each presenter took a 
different approach to this issue. Peasnell provided an 
academic view; Holgate gave a practitioner insight; 
Mackintosh gave insights from a national standard-setting 
perspective, while Teixeria provided an international 
overview from the IASB. Finally, Moxey gave a summary of 
a professional institute’s views, namely ACCA. A brief 
précis of their presentations is provided before a 
comparative overview of the five presentations.
ken peAsnell
Peasnell’s presentation tackled key issues of the current 
crisis: asset securitisation, fair values and the credit 
crunch. He also focused on accounting and financial 
reporting’s role in this crisis. He stated that the crisis itself 
was a macroeconomic phenomenon caused by, inter alia, 
surging house prices and low interest rates. This led to 
increased lending which the banks financed through the 
use of, and reliance on, wholesale money markets backed 
by asset securitisation. The economic boom led to over-
confidence. Asset securitisation was achieved by the banks 
seeking new finance vehicles to back lending and the 
development of more complex derivatives. Bad lending 
practices drove out good. Risk was spread rather than managed. 
The real quality of underlying assets and actual credit 
ratings deteriorated. Lack of prudential corporate governance, 
bank bonus schemes and credit default swaps also 
contributed to the potential sub-prime problems. Eventually, 
the securitisation market collapsed, causing a funding crisis. 
Peasnell then investigated the issues relating to 
accounting. First, in relation to off-balance sheet financing, 
he observed that Northern Rock’s securitisations were on 
balance sheet. He cited academic research in the US (eg 
Landsman et al. 2008) to show that the securities markets 
were mature and sophisticated enough to value businesses. 
Second, in terms of the regulatory framework, under Basel 
I and Basel II capital definitions start with accounting 
numbers. Therefore, accounting was a symptom and not a 
cause of the crisis; thus he blamed the regulations per se, 
rather than accounting, and was therefore of the opinion 
that the focus for change should be on regulation. Third, 
Qualifying Special Purpose Entities (QSPEs) were set up as 
possible financing vehicles for SPE holders. Increasingly, 
however, they handled complex bundles of securities (including 
derivatives) requiring active management and financial 
support. Many SPEs had to be rescued: raising doubts as 
to whether the original assets had been ‘sold’ or ‘loaned’. 
So how should these property-backed assets be valued, 
given that they have lost value? In a fair value world, fair 
value estimates become imprecise in illiquid markets, with 
fire sales acting as market benchmark prices. Peasnell 
pointed out that the IASB response was to allow some 
reclassifications of certain non-derivative financial assets 
out of profit and loss to cost. In Peasnell’s view, the stock 
market does not believe fair value understates asset values, 
as 59% of US banks were trading in November 2008 at less 
than book value. Peasnell then gave a numerical example 
of uncorrelated errors, showing that a balance sheet error 
of 10% could result in an income error with a standard 
deviation of 63%. Overall, therefore, Peasnell presented 
the potentially controversial view that the current crisis 
posed no new issues for financial reporting and is 
essentially a fundamental problem of bank regulation, 
governance and management.
peTeR holGATe
Holgate investigated the credit crunch crisis from a 
professional firm’s perspective. He pointed out the problems 
arising from huge financial losses on financial markets with 
‘thin markets’ that lacked liquidity for normal trading. These 
transactions at low prices have caused fair value losses. This 
has led to criticisms of fair value. However, Holgate thought 
we needed more rather than less fair value information on 
assets and liabilities. There had been a partial abandonment 
of fair value by companies such as Deutsche Bank which 
reported a profit through reclassification rather than a loss. 
However, fair value continues to be used in 99% of cases. 
The IASB’s new Exposure Draft, Investments in Debt 
Instruments, issued in December 2008, highlighted the 
need for more disclosure. However, the short time period 
for discussion and its extended scope led to a lack of 
support. The financial problems have led to a lot more 
scrutiny and detailed disclosures on the impairment of 
financial assets, property, plant and equipment and stock. 
There is also widespread concern with going concern as 
the basis for the preparation of accounts. Negative audit 
opinions might well have effects on businesses’ ability to 
obtain future financing. Holgate also commented on the 
world of potential IFRS adoption by 2011/2012. He thought 
that the current dominance of the US and EU would be 
watered down as more of the world adopted IFRS. Already, 
fewer foreign private issuers were listing on the US market. 
He also thought that it is hard to find examples of successful 
private sector, non-governmental bodies such as the IASB. 
The IASB will need to manage a policy of political engagement, 
given its recent profile, and will also need to protect the 
integrity and independence of financial standards.
iAn mACkinTosh
Mackintosh outlined a number of potential scenarios for 
standard setting, and the role of UK GAAP in the context of 
current world events in accounting. He first outlined some 
key recent events: August 2008, the US announcement of 
a road map; September 2008, the continuing credit crisis 
and falling equity markets; October 2008 ‘Black Monday’ 
when amendments to IAS 39 were adopted without 
following due process and under pressure from the 
European Commission; pressure from the European 
Commission on fair value options; November 2008 US 
promises to make a decision on IFRS adoption by 2011. 
There is currently a difference in approach to standards 
setting: the European Commission demands urgent 
change while the US and the rest of the world want due 
process. The US is also concerned about its future 
potential adoption of IFRS. Meanwhile, the IASB provided a 
range of responses to the present situation. 
3. discussion
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As a result of this Mackintosh set out four possible 
scenarios. In scenario 1, Europe believes the IASB has not 
responded adequately and seeks an EU ‘carve-out’. The 
US would then either lose interest in IFRS, or persevere 
thus isolating Europe. Under scenario 2, the G20 believes 
the IASB has not responded appropriately and makes 
moves to replace it. Scenario 3 sees the US isolated from 
IFRS, choosing non-adoption. Both regimes, US GAAP and 
IFRS, remain, with IASB continuing its efforts to win over 
the rest of the world. Finally, Mackintosh presented the 
‘glory’ scenario – scenario 4, where IASB and FASB 
proposals on the credit crunch are adopted by the G20 
and the European Commission, and the US moves towards 
adoption. The position of UK GAAP under scenario 4 would 
be that IFRS would be extended to all publicly accountable 
entities. Micro entities might be able to retain Financial 
Reporting Standards for Smaller Entities (FRSSE). Those 
entities that are not micro, small or publicly accountable 
could use IFRS for SMEs. Under the other scenarios, the UK 
and Europe would become isolated from the rest of the world.
AlAn TeixeRiA
Teixeria covered the benefits and challenges of global 
standards, the FASB-IASB Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) and a review of the credit crisis. Consistency of 
financial reporting is the main benefit of global standards. 
This will create a high-quality financial reporting systems 
that will increase investment and reduce the cost of 
capital. There has already been substantial progress 
towards world-wide adoption of IFRS. In January 2009, 
IFRS are used in over 110 jurisdictions by listed companies 
and in over 80 by unlisted companies. At present 39% of 
fortune Global 500 companies use IFRS, with 31% using 
US GAAP and 31% using individual GAAP. The percentage 
using IFRS is likely to rise. The SEC has prepared a road 
map for convergence, with a decision in 2011 about 
possible implementation in 2014–16. World adoption of a 
single set of high-quality global accounting standards 
would be ideal. However, there are problems, for example, 
of local endorsement, local adoptions, translations and 
enforcement. In a legalised jurisdictional framework 
adoption may be slow. Some countries do not have 
specialised financial terminology for translation, and 
auditing standards vary globally. The FASB-IASB MoU will 
lead to an aligned conceptual framework, removing selected 
differences in the short term and issuing common standards 
in the future. A number of firm dates are provided for 
financial statement presentation, fair value measurement, 
financial instruments, consolidation, SPE and post-
employment benefits. A consequence of the continued 
credit crisis was European pressure for reclassification out 
of fair value. To prevent a European carve-out, the IASB 
issued revisions to IAS 39 and IFRS 7. This amendment 
addressed one difference with US GAAP, but the many other 
differences would only be met with common standards.
pAul moxey
Moxey’s presentation provided a view from ACCA. It was 
given against the background of the credit crunch from a 
corporate governance perspective. Moxey outlined the 
unprecedented recent growth in the banking sector. ACCA 
had held a number of meetings to examine and potentially 
identify the key causes of the credit crunch (eg 
inappropriate remuneration structures, poor risk reporting 
and lack of accountability) as well as contributory factors 
(eg over-complex financial products, excessive leverage, 
complacency, greed and interconnected financial 
institutions). We have not learnt important lessons from 
the past such as the East Asia crises in the late 1990s, 
Enron and WorldCom. 
Against this backdrop ACCA has developed ten principles 
of good corporate governance where boards direct and 
control organisations in the interests of long-term owners. 
Boards should be accountable and should obey the spirit 
not the letter of the regulatory framework. Moxey 
discussed several of ACCA’s principles and their 
implications. Performance schemes should be based on 
sound principles properly applied. Risk management and 
remuneration systems must be linked. In addition, boards 
and shareholders should receive appropriate, clear and 
reliable information on risk and financial results. The 
highly sophisticated risk management functions of banks 
have been found wanting. A lack of understanding of new 
financial products and their complexity at board level 
allowed traders free rein. This was compounded by a lack 
of detail on the range of risks and a belief in the efficient 
market. The role of audit committees and internal auditors 
needs to be strengthened. Audit committees need 
unsanitised information and internal auditors need to be 
objective and independent. These problems are 
compounded by the complexity and length of IFRS. The 
use of fair value can create anomalous results whereby if a 
bank holds debt and the value of the debt is reduced, the 
bank can report a ‘profit’ on the reduction. 
Recent events have shown the fragility of financial 
institutions. Moxey pointed out that there was a need for 
debate and research on key issues such as: the purpose of 
accounts; the responsibility of accountants; the 
expectations of users; the key role of information in risk; 
the complexity of accounts; and the expectations gap. 
Under Basel requirements, when asset quality lowers then 
so does capital. Banks need capital at the very time when 
they have less, leading to reduced assets and a worsened 
credit environment. Basel II has increased this pro-
cyclicality effect. Inconsistencies in capital regulations 
encourage banks to use off- balance sheet vehicles to hold 
assets to lower required regulatory capital. However, these 
off- balance sheet liabilities were still, in effect, institutional 
liabilities. There is an urgent need to reconsider their 
accounting treatment. The present system is in danger of 
permitting profits to be retained in the private sector, but 
losses to be met by the public. The ten principles of 
corporate governance set out by ACCA would hopefully 
improve the current situation.
The papers in Table 1 have been grouped into two broad 
categories rather than being dealt with in their strict order 
of presentation. In the first group, we look at the papers by 
Peasnell, Moxey and Holgate who give very different views 
of the role of accounting. In the second group, we have 
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Mackintosh and Teixeria, who present their views on where 
the current crisis has left standard setting both at the 
national and international level. There is, however, some 
overlap between the two groups, with Holgate’s paper in 
particular straddling both groups.
The authors approach their topics from very different 
perspectives. Ken Peasnell is a very experienced 
accounting and finance academic from Lancaster 
University and was able to provide an academic 
perspective on the credit crunch, drawing in particular on 
some recent research published in the Accounting Review 
a top-quality US refereed academic journal. Peter Holgate 
by contrast, is a well-respected accounting practitioner. 
Peter is senior technical partner for the UK firm of 
PricewaterhouseCoopers and was able to provide an 
up-to-date and informed practice-based perspective on 
the topic. Paul Moxey provided a third perspective as Head 
of Corporate Governance and Risk Management of ACCA. 
ACCA has observed, researched and commented on the 
credit crunch from an independent, but very interested, 
perspective. Ian Mackintosh and Alan Teixeria both gave 
views on the present financial situation from a standard 
setters perspective. However, their perspectives varied 
widely. Ian approached the topic as head of a national 
standard setting body, the UK’s Accounting Standards 
Board. He can, therefore, be seen as an informed outsider 
in his comments on the IASB. By contrast, Alan can be 
seen as an informed insider. He is Director, Technical 
Activities, IASB, and thus is intimately involved with the 
current practices and procedures of the IASB.
These differing backgrounds were reflected in the nature 
of their contributions. Peasnell provided an academic 
perspective on the current credit crunch, particularly the 
role played by accounting and challenged many widely 
held assumptions. Holgate investigated the role which 
accounting played in the credit crunch and then 
investigated, from a practitioner-perspective, the response 
of the IASB. Moxey investigated the nature and function of 
the accounting crisis from the perspective of a set of ten 
principles on improved corporate governance devised by 
ACCA. Mackintosh looked at a timeline of recent events 
before proposing four possible scenarios for the future of 
international standard setting. Finally, Teixeria looked at 
the benefits of global standards and the challenges facing 
international standard setters, the FASB-IASB 
Memorandum of Understanding, and reviewed the credit 
crisis from a standard setting perspective.
The first group of papers (Peasnell, Holgate and Moxey) 
therefore focused on the underlying credit crunch and the 
problems it poses for accountants. Interestingly, the 
speakers were divided in their views, demonstrating the 
problems which these catastrophic global events has 
caused for the accounting community. While all three 
speakers broadly agreed on the causes of the present 
crisis, their analysis of the part played by accounting was 
very different. Peasnell and Holgate saw accounting as 
basically a medium that did not affect the result, while 
Moxey was more critical of accounting per se. Peasnell, for 
example, pointed out that in the UK the spectacular failure 
of Northern Rock was not caused by off- balance sheet 
financing nor did academic research support the notion 
that in the US, off- balance sheet financing fooled 
investors. Peasnell was also of the opinion that the US 
stock market did not believe that fair value overstated 
asset values. Holgate also did not blame fair value, arguing 
that in the current crisis we need more rather than less 
information on current values. By contrast, Moxey was 
more critical of accounting in general and of fair value per 
se. He believed that the credit crisis asked fundamental 
questions of accounting, such as the purpose of accounts, 
the complexity of accounting, the role of cash and the 
relationship between accounts and risk. In addition, he 
highlighted deficiencies in IFRS. Recent developments in 
IFRS had added to their complexity and length, but not 
necessarily to their clarity or ease of understanding. Fair 
value was blamed for producing anomalous results and 
also for creating problems of pro-cyclicality. Unlike 
Peasnell and Holgate, he therefore did not see accounting 
as an innocent player.
Four of the speakers were concerned with IAS 39 
reclassification. They approached this from slightly 
different perspectives. Peasnell’s comments were mainly 
descriptive and he did not accept that there was a problem 
with fair value per se. Holgate suggested that IAS 39 was 
principally a presentational change with disclosures in the 
notes, and that few companies had actually made use of it. 
Mackintosh and Teixeria took a more political stance. 
Mackintosh saw the reclassification as an example of 
pressure from the European Commission, while Teixeria 
focused on the day-to-day background that had led to the 
revisions to IAS 39. He also pointed out that in the overall 
context of differences between IFRS and US GAAP, this was 
a minor difference and had highlighted the need to focus 
on core issues rather than detail.
Apart from their discussion of the IAS 39 carve-out; 
Mackintosh and Teixeria were particularly concerned with 
geopolitical standard setting. Mackintosh saw the credit 
crunch as leading to a fundamental crossroads for 
international standard setting. This could lead to (1) A 
European carve out with either an isolated US or Europe, 
depending on the US attitude; (2) A takeover by the G20 of 
the IASB; (3) Non-adoption by the US of IFRS and the 
current situation of US and international GAAP remaining; 
and (4) worldwide agreement, including agreement 
between the US and the UK. Under the fourth option, the 
UK would benefit, but under the other three options UK 
GAAP would suffer. Holgate commented on this scenario 
and suggested that, as more countries sign up to IAS 
European and US influence would decline. This takes 
Mackintosh’s scenario even further as it suggests that even 
under scenario 4 the UK is likely to lose influence. Holgate 
also saw political aspects of the IASB’s role as essential – 
especially given the current crisis. Rather than focus on 
the ‘death or glory’ options outlined by Mackintosh, 
Teixeria emphasised the relationship between US GAAP 
and IFRS. He outlined the current efforts by the US and 
IFRS to enhance and develop mutual understanding, and 
set out milestones on the way towards convergence and 
continued cooperation.
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Table 1: Thematic overview of the five presentations 
author background context Topic area Key issues/findings
Ken Peasnell 
Lancaster University
Academic UK, International Asset, 
securitisation, 
fair value, 
credit crunch
A long economic boom led to increased loans and 
growth in asset securitisation. US securitisation was 
off-balance sheet, but this did not delude investors as 
sophisticated capital markets are able effectively to 
value business. Fair value problems re asset valuation 
in thin markets associated with financial crisis Current 
crisis, no new issues for financial reporting more a 
problem of bank regulation, governance and 
management.
Paul Moxey 
ACCA
Professional 
institute
UK, International Accounting, 
corporate 
governance 
and credit 
crunch
Global banking has grown rapidly in recent years. The 
roots of the credit crunch were traced to poor 
corporate governance, inappropriate risk and reward 
structures, and poor levels of risk management 
information and reporting. ACCA proposes ten 
principles of corporate governance to redress these 
issues. It was argued that it was time to look at the 
basics of accounting, and ask some fundamental 
questions concerning the purpose and use of 
accounting information.
Peter Holgate 
PricewaterhouseCoopers
Practitioner UK, International Organisational 
politics
Huge losses on financial assets. Fair value has been 
criticised. More, not less, disclosure would be 
beneficial in determining the value of assets and 
liabilities. A partial retreat occurred through the IAS 
39 reclassification amendment. Increasing problems 
with going concern questions and implications for the 
audit opinion. Can the IASB as a private sector body 
act without political interference?
Ian Mackintosh 
ASB
Standard 
setter
International 
regulations
Regulatory 
change
From August to November 2008, there was a 
sequence of events in accounting, set against the 
background of the credit crunch, such as amendment 
to IAS 39, SEC road map for IFRS adoption. The IAS 
39 amendments highlighted tensions in achieving 
global accounting standards. Four potential scenarios: 
European carve-out; G20 replaces IASB; US rejects 
IFRS; and IASB/FASB and G20 all adopt IFRS. If latter 
option, IFRS could be extended to all publicly 
accountable entities. Micro entities would not report 
under IFRS; smaller entities would retain FRSSE.
Alan Teixeria 
IASB
Standard 
setter
International Spread of 
IFRS
Benefit of IFRS is global consistency. In July 2009, 
IFRS used by listed companies in over 110 countries 
and unlisted companies in 80 countries. The ideal for 
global standards would be uniform adoption of IASB 
without localised endorsement or adaptation. Slow 
process of change hampered by differing legal systems 
and the status of accounting standards in law. 
Translation and enforcement issues are also significant. 
An ongoing convergence programme between IASB 
and FASB (MoU) with projects and key milestones 
outlined. Tension from conflicting interests and IASB 
amendments to IAS 39. Crisis has led to focus on core 
issues in convergence rather than detail.
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The five papers were presented at a very interesting time, 
both economically and politically. The financial crisis and 
associated credit crunch has led to a re-questioning of 
aspects of accounting, in particular recognition and 
measurement issues, corporate governance and the 
current regulatory system that governs accounting. While 
some of these areas are not new, perhaps the financial 
crisis has led to a greater concentration on them and also 
provided the accountancy profession, regulatory bodies 
and standard setters with an opportunity to reflect on the 
core issues. The crisis has also contextualised some of the 
difficulties facing international convergence.
Given the impact of the current financial crisis it is not 
surprising that all the speakers used it as a context for 
their presentations – its causes, the interdependence of 
financial markets, its impact on accounting and 
governance issues, and the future challenges to the 
accounting profession and changes that need to be made. 
It is clear that there is no single answer, just as there was 
no single cause of the crisis. A multi-dimensional approach 
is therefore appropriate given the complexities associated 
with risk, reward structures, lending, governance, 
behavioural issues and accounting recognition and 
measurement. 
The speakers dealt with different questions and 
approached the issues from differing perspectives. Ken 
Peasnell, for example, is a leading UK accounting and 
finance academic. He was supportive of the role of 
accounting in the credit crisis. He recognised that while 
asset securitisation was off-balance sheet, this did not fool 
investors as sophisticated capital markets are still able to 
value businesses. He believed the problem was connected 
with the actual levels and understanding of risk, and the 
trading volume of asset-backed derivatives, and not 
necessarily whether they appear on or off-balance sheet. 
He also did not believe that fair value understated market 
value, but rather that in times of financial crisis fair value is 
problematic in its application in thin markets. The main 
issues remained regulation, governance and management 
and these should be separated from any accounting 
issues, which are more symptomatic than causal. Peter 
Holgate, a PricewaterhouseCoopers partner, was also 
supportive of accounting. He dealt with the IAS 39 
reclassification amendment and the increasing problems 
that practising accountants like himself had with going 
concern in the global financial crisis. Like Ian Macintosh, 
Peter Holgate discussed the political nature of the IASB, 
highlighting its unusual role as a non-governmental body. 
Ian Mackintosh also dwelt on the political nature of the 
IASB. He presented a series of possible scenarios which 
could arise in the future. In some of these the IFRS would 
flourish; in others it would not. Alan Teixeria came to the 
debate with an international accounting perspective given 
his role at the IASB. He showed how the use of IFRS has 
increased rapidly. He also demonstrated the problems 
involved in translation, adaptation and enforcement. His 
view as an international standard setter thus neatly 
complemented that of Ian Macintosh. Finally, Paul Moxey 
from ACCA provided an extremely critical look at the role 
of accounting. Indeed, he was probably the most critical of 
the five speakers. He analysed the roots of the credit 
crunch and proposed ten principles of corporate 
governance which, he argued, would improve the present 
system of board governance. Paul was extremely critical of 
business and banks in general, but also of accounting. He 
believed it was time to look at some of the basics of 
accounting, its purpose and use of financial statements.
Given these differences in background and perspective the 
authors suggest a range of questions which are 
summarised below.
What should the appropriate measurement system for •	
financial statements be? Is fair value appropriate in 
times of economic crisis?
How should accountants treat going concern in times •	
of economic downturn? What assumptions can be 
made about the surety of future financing requirements 
consistent with going concern?
How do we balance being cautious and fair to investors •	
without turning the going concern qualification into a 
self-fulfilling prophecy?
Do we need to look again at the role of accounting •	
practices such as off-balance sheet financing, credit 
default swaps etc?
Will the IASB be able to survive as a private sector •	
standard setting body?
What will be the future relationship between the IASB, •	
the FASB and the European Union, the G20 and 
individual countries, such as China?
How will future potential changes to governance and •	
risk reporting and requirements affect accounting and 
the accounting profession?
What will be the effects of the financial crisis, especially •	
the IAS 39 amendment process, on the overall ideal of 
global accounting standard convergence and the future 
of the US-IASB road map?
Such important questions are unlikely to be solved quickly. 
Although at the time of writing this report (November 
2009) some of the pressures have eased, the underlying 
questions persist. What the speakers in the symposium 
have emphasised is the fundamental and problematic 
nature of key issues of accounting recognition and 
measurement. They have also tentatively mapped out 
some possibilities about the future development of 
accounting. Only time will tell whether their reflections are 
accurate or not.
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